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Abstract
With the onset of distributed energy resources in the electricity generation, the sce-
narios for protection and automation are becoming challenging. Even with guidelines
like IEC61850 which focuses on digital substations there is a big issue in terms of inte-
grating systems from different vendors. On the other hand IEC 61499 is moving ahead
with enabling distributed automation and control in Industrial environment.
This report aims to answer if it is possible to design an IED based on IEC61850 us-
ing IEC61499. This is achieved by writing the whole communication layers for IEC
61850 SV and GOOSE communication systems using linux socket programming in
c++ which is the language in which IEC61499 4diac-forte has been written at the back
end. Function Blocks were developed using IEC61499 4diac-ide which would mimic
the IEC 61850 based logical nodes.
A series of test cases where conducted and analysed. Based on the analysis we can say
that it is possible to build a system to which is able to mimic a IED based on IEC61850
using the IEC61499 framework for Distributed Industrial Automation and Control.
The results also show that at the current stage due to delays in the internal threads of
the software code it isn’t possible to reach the extent which can be achieved using a
specific hardware, but there is also hope that as the software undergoes development
it is possible to be able to reach a considerable pace. The whole implementation was
carried out using c++ and is available for everyone.
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1 Introduction
Today’s Electric Grid is one of the most fascinating and complicated systems made
by humans. It is the responsibility of the protection relays (IED’s) to keep them safe.
Most of these relays though operating on the same principles are closed source black
boxes supplied by a very limited number of vendors around the world. ABB, Siemens,
Schneider and GE are the major vendors in this list. They usually create software algo-
rithms and they are only available in their specific platform and cannot be combined
with others. The hardware and software give very limited configuration scope for the
end user. No user specific functions can be added into the system. These traditional
systems have an issue with upgradability and often requires a complete replacement
of the whole system when a higher upgrade is required. These systems are also dis-
tributed in nature and hence results in protection relays being able to control only one
bay. Even with IEC 61850 bringing in guidelines for making the interoperability for
digital substations by standardizing the information classes and data flow in a substa-
tion, we still face issues in interoperating the systems marketed by the leaders.
On the other hand, in the field of industrial automation we have seen distributed
control becoming more common and readily available for usage. The communica-
tion between them is made by using higher level protocol over TCP/IP making them
very efficient and reliable. One standard, IEC 61499 gives a well-defined tool where
the individual systems are implemented as reusable patches and the communication
between these reusable patches are well defined. The tool is also efficient in cross
platform usage. The system can be implemented in many industrial PLCs, Raspber-
ryPi, computer with Linux/Windows operating systems. Once tested on one platform
porting it to another platform is very easy. Upgrading the system and hardware is
also made easy with this. This standard has recently found importance in the field of
Electrical Protection and Automation and many in the field of academics, engineering
and hobbyists have been using it to develop academic and personal projects.
The aim of the project is to use the portable characteristics of IEC 61499, a framework
for distributed industrial automation and control and IEC 61850 digital substation
specification thereby creating a totally user configurable protection and automation
system. The goal is to understand how the basic communication works as per IEC
61499 and implement IEC 61850 information exchange protocols like SV and GOOSE.
It also involves design of Logical nodes and to test on a simple protection system
setup.
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1.1 Related Work
A few authors have also proposed some methods on implementing systems using IEC
61499.
In a paper presented by Vlad, Popa, Turcu and Buzduga they present a solution where
they were successful in modelling the fucntions of IEC61850 using IEC61499. Their
work shows that the use of the function blocks of IEC 61499 made the design of sub-
station control applications modular and reusable. The work also explored GOOSE
messaging but using a third party ACSI server.[20]
In another work by Vlad, Popa, Turcu and Buzduga they propose of using IEC 61499
based system control for power grid protection system. The work consists of devel-
oping the control logic using IEC 61499 but uses an IEC 61850 based communication
protocols. In order to link between the two protocols, they use a virtual server to trans-
fer the data received through the IEC61850 communication protocols. [19]
In another work Higgins, Vyatkin, Nair and Schwarz propose a way of using the func-
tion blocks of IEC 61499 and the application functions and communication standards
defined in IEC 61850 to describe a distributed control scheme. The article recognizes
the challenges faced by the modern electricity grid due to addition of renewable en-
ergy sources which are intermittent in nature, the trend towards distributed energy
resources, increasing regulations in the electricity markets and security concerns [8]
In another work by Xu, Yang, Vyatkin and Berber they explore the possibility of im-
plementation of IEC61850 GOOSE Messaging in IEC 61499. They can successfully im-
plement the data transfer using GOOSE Messaging but using targeted developmen-
tal kit - ISaGRAF1. This is a paid platform which can be used to develop IEC 61499
system level control functions. In this paper, we take it to a step higher in terms of
making things completely open till the basic level to the user using open source appli-
cations.[21]
1.2 Problem Definition
If we investigate today’s Substation Control Systems (SCS) and Intelligent Electronic
Devices (IED), we see that we have a lot of black boxes which are proprietary (ABB,
Siemens, Schneider, GE. . . ) and need trained personnel from the manufacturer to be
able to test and commission these systems. We are to get very limited idea on how
things work inside the IED’s. Also, these systems are proportional to the size of the
substation i.e., with the increase in the number of bays in the substation we have an
1ISaGRAF is a complete industrial software package consisting PLC Tools, a Runtime engine and
development tools for automation control applications designed by Rockwell Automation.
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increase in the number of IED’s used. These IED’s and SCS also have very limited
freedom for configuration of user-defined functions. On the other hand, the software
upgrade can be done only to a limited extent. A major firmware upgrade can never be
carried out within these systems. These systems come with limited protection curves
and settings which must be chosen from by the user. Apart from that they have a se-
rious interoperability issue. This creates a big problem in the future when you have
more and more distributed generation sources coming, increasing the number of bays
and intermittency with them.
This project aims to create a proof of concept by mapping the IEC61850 functions using
IEC61499 function blocks. The thesis is a part of a bigger project and the figure below
explains to you on how both the projects are related. This project creates the back-end
of the functions which can be used by a friend to design his front-end system. The
work shows that with basic c++ we have been able to create a system which is easy to
use, portable, upgradable and is expandable. This would enable the end user we give
the freedom of networking and c++ we will be able to turn an industrial computer, a
raspberry pi, most of the industrial PLC into an IED depending on the type of appli-
cation required.
The following figure 1 shows the whole project in a simple way.
1.3 Objectives
The following are the major aims and objectives of the thesis work.
1. Perform a literature review in understanding on to what extent IEC 61850 func-
tions are implemented in IEC 61499.
2. Understand the OSI model involved in the Communication protocols of IEC61850
Sampled Values and GOOSE messages.
3. Understand the implementation of Communication layer in IEC 61499.
4. Implement communication layers in IEC61499 based on the operating principles
of IEC61850.
5. Test the communication between a publisher and subscriber.
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Figure 1: Project’s main Idea
6. Design basic Function blocks to simulate a protection system and check the en-
abling of transmission of a GOOSE message.
7. Explore the possibility of implementation with a real time simulator and suggest
improvements on the IEC61499 forte.
1.4 Motivation
The world is moving towards a greener future, but the consumption of electricity has
also increased on a very large scale. According to IEA, the world electricity consump-
tion increased by a factor of 4% and on other hand the increase in renewable energy
source was 7% [9]. Looking at this rate the growth of renewable energy resources is
inevitable, but even a small amount of renewable energy generation of about 4500
MW would need the whole power grid to be reinforced in order to overcome the sta-
bility issues in the power network[4]. With this growth in renewable energy sources
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smarter grids are the future and digitizing the substations are one of the major solu-
tions which would improve the stability of the power networks and allow a suite of
latest technologies including big data to be implemented for a very efficient use of
power networks[6]. This project can be considered as the first baby step towards vir-
tualizing relays bringing the next level development in the field of electrical network
protection and automation.
1.5 Overview
This document has been divided largely into three parts Literature Review, DesignMethod-
ology and Testing sections.
The section Literature review starts by covering the works carried out in the field of
integrating IEC 61499 and IEC 61850 in the field of electrical network protection and
automation. It also covers the basic information required about the two standards IEC
61850 and IEC 61499 and mainly focusing on the protocols and Logical Nodes in case
of IEC61850 and Function Blocks in case of IEC 61499. A brief description about the
OSI layer model is also defined which serves as a base for later.
The section Detailed Design Methodology describes in detail on what has been done as
part of the project. It has following major subsections
1. Communication Stack SV and GOOSE - This sections in detail explains how the
the data frames from IEC 61850 SV and GOOSE look like. It also brings light to
how the data is encapsulated in each layer before being passed to the next layer.
The encoding rules and corresponding tags are also mentioned for each variable
in the data frame along with what it means and why it is necessary.
2. Communication Stack in IEC 61499 - This section explains how the layered net-
work architecture can be implemented in IEC 61499. The main methods which
help in establishing the connection and sending and receiving data are also ex-
plained.
3. The Integration - This section describes in detail on how can the layered archi-
tecture of IEC 61499 be used for the implementation of the IEC 61850 based pro-
tocols.
4. The last section describes on how to design a Logical node and integrating the
whole design to mimic a system’s behaviour under which is under fault.
There is the testing section which describes the different scenarios under which the
system was tested and the results are analysed and documented along with the ideas
for improvement. Some of the smaller snippets of codes are shared as part of Ap-
pendix.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW Page No. 13
2 Literature Review
The aim of this part of the document is to introduce the important concepts which are
to be known in order to understand the main work better. This section has four sub
sections defining important concepts in IEC 61850, a second subsection defining the
basics about IEC 61499, a basic introduction of the OSI layer model in the third section
and the last part which tell about the advantage of interlinking them together.
2.1 IEC 61850
Remote control and operation of substations started with the most basic case where
a control center used normal telephone line to contact an operator present in a sub-
station to do certain switching. During 1930’s, the same telephone communications
powered switching devices which could do some basic switching and update a status
of a very few equipment. Further in 1960’s the growth of communication systems led
to the implementation of Data acquisition systems (DAS) which could now collect the
data from the substations. With the growth of the modern computing, today a single
IED can hold, process and send hundreds of digital and analog signals[3].
With the growth of the size of the electric network and the size and rating of the sub-
station new technologies were required. With newer vendors coming into the market
inter-operability was the main issue faced in SCS. Hence the main requirements of the
substation control system was a new guideline which would enable control of many
equipment and enable many devices to communicate with each other making automa-
tion and response time quicker[3].
In around the year 2000s, the IEC61850 standard was introduced in the field by IEC’s
Technical Committee(TC) 57. The committee came up with standardizing the inter-
operability issues, data modelling inside a relay and communication protocols. The
concept of Physical Device, Logical Device and Logical Nodes (LN) is used to classify
the devices, the function performed and the grouping of functions in a SCS [15].
The figure 2 shows is a representation of the relationship between a Physical Device, a
Logical Device and a Logical Node The LN’s are the basic building blocks of IEC61850
SCS systems. These are referred by 4 letter unique codes (MMXU, PTOC, PTRC...)
and perform a specific task inside them by interacting a specific set of variables. The
algorithm inside each LN is vendor specific and is usually not accessible by any out-
sider / final user. In case of a SCS, these LN’s are interconnected in a specific fashion
which would enable a measurement chain, protection chain, interlocking chain etc for
efficient and reliable operation of a substation. This is a task which is defined in a clear
way in the guidelines and the communication of data between them is well defined if
they reside in different systems. This enables the configuration of IED’s from different
vendors ensuring their inter-operability.
In order to have the communication between LN’s strict, IEC61850 has come up with
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Figure 2: Relationship between Physical and Logical Device and Logical node
Common Data Class (CDC), which basically are classes of individual data variables
also called as data attributes. These CDC’s are standardized and the instance of which
when used are called Data Objects(DO). This object oriented approach is what keeps
IEC61850 apart from the legacy protocols like MODBUS, DNP3 etc.
These LN’s are grouped together according to their functionalities ans these are re-
ferred together as Logical Devices. The logical nodes in a logical device has the same
first letter (P-Protection (PTOC, PTRC.), M-Measurement (MMXU..)). The Physical
Device, as the name suggest is any physical device used in a SCS for any sort of
function, starting from measurement, protection, data logging, data transmission etc.
IED’s, RTU’s, Server’s etc. are classical examples.
The architecture for designing and configuring a SCS as per IEC61850 is shown in
the figure 3 below. The substation is divided into three with respect to the information
as Process, Bay and Station level.
• Process Level - This level involves actual devices. Measurement devices like
current and voltage transformer, digital measurement units like Merging units,
switchgears, disconnectors etc are involved. The basic information here is the
measurement data which is transferred using Sampled Values electronically or
through copper hardwired connections.
• Bay Level - This level involves all the protection IED’s, RTU’s and bay con-
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trollers. These devices receive measurements and status from the process level.
• Station Level - In this level it is where the HMI’s, station computers, servers,
memory loggers, gateways and external interfaces are present.
The communication between substation equipment are divided into two bus (usually
a switch or the medium where all the data is exchanged), the Process and Station bus.
• Process Bus - where all the equipment present in the substation are able to com-
municate with the devices like bay controllers present in Bay level.
• Station Bus - where inter-bay level data are exchanged (GOOSE messages) and
also the data between Bay and Station level are exchanged (MMS)
Figure 3: IEC61850 Substation Architecture [11]
2.1.1 Sampled Values
Sampled Values (SV) is a communication protocol defined in IEC61850-9-2 and which
defines the way to publish secondary values of measurement (Current and Voltages)
in the substation network. The main aim of introducing this system was to remove
the number of Copper cables used in the substation along with giving a real time data
transfer to the substation process bus where any IED can subscribe to the values.
The sampled values are generated with the help of devices called Merging-Units.
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These units use convert the analog values to precise stream of digital data. These sam-
pled values publish the values of eight measurements (3-phases and neutral) directly
out of a highly precise Analog-to-Digital Converter simultaneously. The measurement
data is available at two sample rates 80 and 256 samples/cycle resulting in 4000 and
12800 samples/second for 50Hz which are mentioned in the SmpCnt flag inside the
packet. This flag resets itself to 0 when the new cycle starts. This data is time critical
and hence acknowledgements are not present but instead the data is sent at regular
intervals as mentioned above. Sampled Values are identified by svID which can be a
16 letter sequence and are also time synchronised with a GPS clock which is marked
with a flag SmpSynch. [11]
2.1.2 GOOSE
Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) is the communication protocol
defined in IEC 61850-8-1. It enables IED’s present in a single network to exchange
messages at a quick pace. It is a fast and the same message is sent multiple times in
order to make it more reliable and hence is acknowledgement free.
GOOSE messages can carry both analog and digital values as part of the payload
but usually is used to send the status of activation or position from one IED to other.
GOOSE is mainly used to implement interlocking and to obtain status. GOOSE mes-
sages similar to SV are time critical and hence are data-link layer communication pro-
tocols and hence use only MAC address and are published and subscribed by IED’s in
the station bus. A GOOSE message is identified by gooseID. Unlike SV the size of the
actual payload and the GOOSE packet will actually change because of the name of the
Data Object in consideration [15].
2.2 IEC 61499
It is a domain specific modelling language built as an extension for IEC61131 to be
used in the field of distributed industrial control systems. The main aim was to en-
able distribution of control schemes and only have communication between the nodes.
Therefore it holds improvements over its predecessors in the fields of encapsulation,
re-usability, portability and a simplified but strong peer-to-peer communication struc-
ture.
The basic way of designing control systems in IEC61499 is to use the Function blocks
(FB’s). Taking a look at the types of FB’s available in IEC61499, there are three kinds.
1. Basic Function Block - These FB’s have a brain and a process part. The following
figure 4 shows you a typical FB. There are two types of inputs for the FB’s which
are events and data. The brain of the FB were the control sequence reside is called
the Event Execution Control(ECC). The ECC as shown in figure 5 is basically a
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state-machine which can store multiple algorithms along with each state. The
following figure shows a typical ECC. Each individual algorithm in the ECC can
use none, some or all of the input data or even internal data. There is also a con-
nection between events and data. This is to say that the input data is refreshed
whenever the corresponding event is changed.
Figure 4: A Basic Function Block
Figure 5: A typical Execution Control Chart
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2. Composite Function Block - As the name suggests it is a composition of multiple
basic function blocks connected in a specific fashion in-order to get a particular
task done. This is IEC 61499’s proof of concept of scalability. There is no require-
ment of algorithms or state-machines here as most of them are already present
in each of the Basic FB’s involved and are run in tandem as per requirement. The
figure 6 represents a Composite Function Block
Figure 6: A Composite Function Block
3. Service Interface Function Block - Any task that does not need a even based exe-
cution or manipulation of variables will be carried by SIFB. IN this paper, it is
the Publish/Subscribe FB whose backend is added with a new set of file so as to
make them enable to carry out the Publish and Subscribing of SV and GOOSE
messages. These FB’s also are useful if needed to access specific parts of the hard-
ware like ports, pins etc. These FB’s can be activated not only by events but also
by external interrupts like arrival of a GOOSE message.[2]
The user is allowed to develop a flexible and vendor independent control system us-
ing the function blocks. Once developed the FB’s can be reused or new ones can be
developed if required. IEC61499 gives a special ability to group these FB’s to perform
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a specific task and also allows to distribute them according to the device in which
they would be run. Each of these function blocks are converted into pieces of software
code blocks. Whenever a particular FB’s task is to performed the FB’s software code
is instantiated into the runtime environment. This needs a Front-end which would
graphically describe the FB’s which is done using an XML based interface. The FB’s
can be designed in an Integrated Development Environment (IDE) and when saved
the IDE stores them as XML files. These files can be shifted to any project and be
reused. The whole control system will be executed over a runtime. For our develop-
ment we use forte (4DIAC Runtime Environment). When the FB’s are exported to the
runtime it is exported as a C++ code. This C++ code is the back-end which is compiled
and allowed by the runtime environment to run when required. [22]
2.3 OSI Layer
Communicating today with a wide variety of devices is possible due to the amazing
back-bone network we have. This is possible due to the common network interface we
have between them. This allows them to effectively communicate and hence handle
data and processing in a safe and distributed way. In the early days when networks
were getting popular the International Organisation for Standardization(ISO) wanted
to create a standard architecture which could make this possible. The current 7-layer
model was proposed by Mike Canepa, Charlie Bachman and team who had developed
the concept for a totally different use at Honeywell. This model has been in use since
1978 as is famously known as the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Model [18].
Each Layer of the OSI model is as shown in the figure 7. We are interested in only
three layers in out implementation. The Physical, Data-link and Application Layers.
1. Physical Layer - The lowest layer in the model and as the name says, it largely
refers to the physical medium through which the data is actually transmitted. It
includes Network Interface Cards (NIC) and cables. Although, it is not necessary
that it should only be the physical mediums that come under physical layer as
there are few functions that are involved in some cases. The same in case of
the hardware, many of the times the hardware can also be involved with the
data-link layer. The main functions of a physical layer can be put into following
groups[14].
• The details of hardware involved in the data transmission or reception.
• Encoding and decoding the signals which are to be sent and received.
• Sending and receiving the data regardless of the medium involved.
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Figure 7: The OSI layer Model[10]
2. Data-link Layer - It is the second lowest layer in the OSI Model. This is the layer
where when devices connected forms a simple network. This is the layer where
data is encapsulated into a frame according to the requirements. This is the first
layer where addressing comes into play. Each device on a network has a specific
hardware address called the MAC address. Data-link layer uses these addresses
to send or receive data. This layer also is responsible for the check in case of data
transmission. So if the data is not transmitted properly it is re-transmitted or an
error flag is raised by the layer[13].
3. Application Layer - The top most layer in the OSI model. It is in this layer that we
have services designed which can be used by other applications to initiate a data
transfer or reception. It is here where we can define multiple protocols and this
layer would call multiple functions in the lower layer based on requirement.
2.4 Work Procedure
The methodology of this project is to understand the how the services are to be de-
signed in IEC 61499 to create an application layer for IEC 61850 defined SV and GOOSE
communication protocols and then define functions which can get the data and encode
as per the Ethernet packet frame for both the protocols and then transmit it over the
network. We will define a Basic FB which can generate and send a data to a publish
FB which can call the application layer for invoking the data transfer.
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3 Detailed Design Methodology
This part is a very detailed description of the work carried out. It starts with under-
standing the layers of OSI model involved in the IEC 61850 communication protocols
Sampled Values and GOOSE messaging. Further in the next subsection the imple-
mentation of the communication stack in IEC 61499 is explained followed by the sec-
tion where the actual implementation of SV and GOOSE communication stacks are
explained in detail. The last section describes the definition of the small setup of func-
tion blocks which work as the logical node in order to explain the running of a simple
automation system during a fault.
3.1 Communication Stack - SV & GOOSE
SV communication protocols are data-link layer protocols, because the rate of trans-
mission is very fast and is run on single network on the process bus. It is published
by a Merging Unit and is subscribed by IED’s which are linked to the specific merg-
ing unit. In order to understand the communication stack involved in a IEC 61850 SV
protocol, we need to look into the contents of a SV Ethernet data frame.
3.1.1 SV Data Frame
The following figure 10 and 9 shows you the detailed overview of a SV data frame.
If we look into each of the components carefully we see the following. We divide
the encoding into two layer data as the way it should work in protocol. Below is the
description of SV frame data in data-link layer
• The first six bytes of the data frame is the Destination MAC address. In case IEC
61850 sampled values, we have pre-defined address which is defined below. So,
regardless of the number of merging units in the substation all of these would
have the same destination address and will be connected to the same process bus.
SV Destination MAC 01:0C:CD:04:XX:XX
Table 1: SV Destination MAC Address [5]
• The second six bytes of the data frame is the source MAC address. This allows
us to identify what system sent the data packet. This would help us in trou-
bleshooting in case there was an issue.
• The next section is optional. Priority tagging would be done depending on the
need of Virtual LAN’s in the network. This done by adding a 32-bit (4-byte) of
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Figure 8: SV Data Frame 1 [5]
Figure 9: SV Data Frame 2 [5]
information between Source MAC address and Ethernet type. The 4 bytes are
subdivided into three components as
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– Tag Protocol Identifier (TPID) - This is always set to 0x8100 as this works as
an identification that this is a IEEE 802.1Q-tagged frame.
– Tag Control Information (TCI) - This carries the information on priority and
VLAN ID etc and is divided into three
∗ Priority Code Point (PCP) - The first 3 bits of the 16 is reserved for pri-
ority tagging. A priority tag of 7 is the highest and 0 is the lowest. We
use a priority of 4 for SV as per standards.
∗ Canonical Format Indicator (CFI) - This is the 4th bit and is used to indi-
cate if the next 12 bits belong to ethernet or not. Since we use ethernet,
we need to set this bit to 0[17].
∗ VLAN ID - The next 12 bits are used to number separate vlan’s ranging
from 0x000 to 0xFFF although some are reserved. We here use 0x000
because we have no VLAN.
• Ethertype - Each of the protocols using ethernet has the same kind off structure
and it is ethertype which differentiates the different types of protocol. It is two
bytes as is set to 0x88BA for IEC61850 SV.
• Application Identifier (APPID) - This is used on the receiver side to differentiate
and identify different types of application association of the data being received.
This is set to 0x4000 for SV as there is no different application in case of SV.
• Length - The next two bytes of the ethernet frame is reserved for allocating the
length of the frame. This would be the number of bytes in the Application Pro-
tocol Data Unit (APDU) plus 8. The 8 includes Reserve1, Reserve2, Length and
APPID.
• Reserve1 - The next two bytes are set for reserve1, te first bit is used to identify if
the value is actual or simulated and the other three bytes are reserved as security
bits and are set to 0 if SV is transmitted without security.
• Reserve2 - It is a 2 byte data which will be set as defined by IEC 62351 when data
is transmitted with security.
As shown in the image 9, we then have the APDU, which is encoded in the Application
layer and is pushed down to the data-link layer where it is encapsulated with the
above mentioned data before transfer. An APDU can have a number of Application
Service Data Unit (ASDU)’s. The SV APDU follows the Abstract Syntax Notation One
(ASN.1) notation which is made of a triplet which has a ASN tag, length of the data and
then the data. Only the data variables are mentioned below and tags are mentioned in
the figure above. Below is the description of SV frame data in application layer
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• The first two bytes are the tag and length of the whole PDU.
• Next information we have the number of ASDU’s we have. According to the
rules of implementation of SV as per the implementation guide. [5]
• The total length of all the ASDU’s involved is mentioned in sequence.
• And then we define each of the individual ASDU’s one after other.
• The information in each of the ASDU’s is mentioned below.
– First the length of the concerned ASDU mentioned
– then we have the sv ID. This is the most important identifier which is used
to identify the connection between a specific MU and IED. The length of the
sv ID can be a maximum of 16 characters.
– we have a smpCnt which refers to Sample Count. Each sample will be
marked with a number. For example if we have the protection samples
being transmitted which is 4000 samples/second. We will have the count
from 0-3999 and when the sample reaches 3999 it resets back to 0
– The confRev refers to the configuration revision. As and when the configu-
ration is changed in the system this is automatically updated.
– The smpSynch tag refers to if the sample is time synchronized to an external
GPS clock. If not this tag has to be given the value 0.
– Next we have the sequence of data and it’s length.
– The following defines on what is present in the data set of each ASDU.
∗ We have measurement values of currents and voltages with their qual-
ity bits. Each value of current and voltage is a 32 bit data, where the
standard rule is that the current would have a precision of 1/1000th of
Amps and voltage will have precision of 1/100th of a volt. The quality
bit is used to define if the data is actual or if it is derived.
ASN.1 Identifier length of data data
Table 2: ASN.1 Notation [5]
3.1.2 GOOSE Data Frame
Similar to the SV data frame , the following image shows you a GOOSE data frame.
Even this frame can be divided into a goosePDU and the front ethernet header. Below
is the detailed description of GOOSE data frame.
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Attribute Name ASN.1 Identifier Length (bytes)
savPdu 0x60 2(complete PDU length)
noAsdu 0x80 1(≤ 8)
seqOfAsdu 0xA2 1(length of all ASDUs´)
seqAsdu 0x30 2(length of particular ASDU)
svID 0x80 1(≤ 16)
smpCnt 0x82 2 (4000 or 12800)
confRev 0x83 4
smpSynch 0x85 1
seqOfData 0x87 64 (4bytes *(8 measurements + quality))
Table 3: ASN.1 details for Sampled Values
• The first twelve bytes of the data frame are as usual the destination and source
MAC address. The destination MAC address for GOOSE would also be set to a
reserved multicast address like the one reserved for SV.
GOOSE Destination MAC 01:0C:CD:01:XX:XX
Table 4: GOOSE Destination MAC Address [16]
• The next 16 bytes are for in case if there is a VLAN configuration same as in case
of SV.
• The Ethertype for GOOSE message is 0x88B8
• The APPID for goose has some restrictions. When compared to the constant AP-
PID of 0x4000 in case of SV, In case of GOOSE we have three broad classification
as follows
– default value - 0x0000
– GOOSE 1 (general) - 0x0000 to 0x3fff
– GOOSE 1A (Trip) - 0x8000 to 0xbfff
• the length is same as in case of SV, it is the length of goosePDU + 8, which involves
the reserve1, reserve2, length and APPID.
• reserve1 is same as in case of SV where it is used to define if the data is actual or
simulated and if GOOSE is being transmitted with security or not.
• reserve2 is according the IEC 62351 if GOOSE is being sent with security.
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Figure 10: GOOSE Data Frame [16]
As shown in the image, the above is the data-link layer encapsulation of a GOOSE
message. The whole payload goosePDU is encoded in the application layer. The fol-
lowing is the explanation of the contents of the goosePDU[16]. Again, even these data
is encoded according to the ASN.1 notation.
• GoCBRef - GOOSE Control block reference is the name of the specific instance of
GOOSE Control Block within a logical node.
It is in the form LDName/LLN0.GoCBInstance
• TimeAllowedtoLive - GOOSE messages are usually transmitted in a very rapid
manner and hence has no acknowledgement and hence these messages are al-
lowed to live for certain time after which these messages expire. The time is
updated when StNum is incremented.
• DatSet - It is the reference to the dataSet which is transmitted as part of the
GOOSE message.
• GoID - This is similar to the svID which is basically enabled to identify the goose
message.
• timeStamp - is the time at which StNum is incremented.
• StNum or Status Number is a counter which increments whenever the GOOSE
message is transmitted, in other words when there is change in the value of the
DatSet. This starts with 1.
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• SqNum or Sequence Number is the number of sequence in the current sequence.
So whenever StNum is changed this number resets to 0. Ohterwise it keeps in-
crementing until the GOOSE message dies.
• Simulation - this is a test bit is used when a simulated value is being sent instead
of the actual value.
• confRev - This is similar to one in SV, it refers to the configuration number. This
basically tells at on how many times the configuration of datSet and its´ variables
have been changed.
• NdsCom or Needs Commissioning, is to be flagged when the system is being
tested.
• NumDatSetEntries the number of data entries being sent through the GOOSE
message.
• allData is where the actual data is residing. But the data is again coded according
to ASN.1 encoding rules. This is because the datatype of the data being trans-
mitted may be different and sometimes even padding is being used.
Attribute Name ASN.1 Identifier Length (bytes)
goCBRef 0x80 variable
timeAllowedToLive 0x81 5)
datSet 0x82 variable
goID 0x83 variable
T 0x84 8(timestamp in Linux Epoch)
stNum 0x85 5
sqNum 0x86 5
simulation 0x87 1(Boolean)
confRev 0x88 5
ndsCom 0x89 1(Boolean)
numDatSetEntries 0x8a 5
allData 0xab variable depending on data
Table 5: ASN.1 details for GOOSE
The task of the project is to understand on how to send and receive SV and GOOSE
data from an application developed in IEC614999. We have to understand the role of
communication stack development in IEC 61499. The next section presents the same.
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3.2 Communication Stack Architecture in IEC 61499
The communication architecture is designed in a very simple way. This has been made
to make sure that there is no standard procedure on which layer or what in a layer
would be implemented. Each layer in IEC 61499 can be assumed as a layer in the OSI
layer. The way to interact with each layer is pretty similar except for the layers in the
end. Each layer in IEC 61499 is implemented as a class with its´ specific methods. Each
of this layer is a inherited class of the parent class CComLayer which defines on how
layers are to be implemented.
The CComLayer class has the following main functions inside it, which are to be imple-
mented as per the protocols requirement.
• openConnection - This function is called to ask the lower layer to open connection
and if it is lowest layer asks the respective port/pin through which communica-
tion has to be done.
Figure 11: Sequence of events during openConnection[1]
• closeConnection - This function when called in current layer will call the close
function in the lower layer and when it is the lowest layer, disconnects from the
port/pin.
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Figure 12: Sequence of events during closeConnection[1]
• sendData - This function sends data to the lower layer and if it is the lowest layer
it sends the data to the port from where it is sent to the network.
Figure 13: Sequence of events during sendData[1]
• recvData - This function when called will call the lower function asking it to send
the data which it is. In case of the lowest layer, it will wait for the interrupt to be
enabled when it gets data from the port.
• processInterrupt - This is called from the layer when there is a need for data pro-
cessing in the layer once data is received.
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Figure 14: Sequence of events during recvData[1]
There is only one class defined in IEC 61499, the CCommFB which defines the func-
tion block of the Publish/Subscribe FB which is basically the communication FB. Only
this FB is capable of calling the methods from a Communication Layer. This is done
by the ID defined. An ID can be defined by the following.
• Protocol : The string that refers to a specific protocol/layer.
• Parameters : Each protocol may require specific parameters which are to be fed
into the protocol.
• ID : Protocol1[Parameter1;...ParameterN].Protocol2[Params]....
So putting this into an example for SV we have designed the following.
sv[].eth[Port; Dest. MAC; APPID]
Here, sv opens a layer which has been designed to act as the application layer for the SV
and eth acts as the data-link layer for the communication. This is possible by writing
two classes based on CCommLayer which would do the defined tasks and when the
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files are generated using CMake2, we will have both the layers written correspond-
ingly linked with the words sv and eth.
Figure 15 is a representation on how the network layers are supposed to work in tan-
dem. The generic usage of the layers are supposed to be to work like Top Layer, Middle
Layer and Bottom Layer approach where,
Figure 15: Generic Network Layer[1]
1. Top Layer - Handle data from all the ports of the FB’s and then send it to the
middle layer. In our case, we get all the currents and voltages from the FB and
then send it to the middle layer, encode them into the SDU’s and further to PDU’s
then forward it to the middle layer.
2. Middle Layer - This is where process on the data, like encoding, compression and
encapsulation should take place. There can be multiple middle layers depending
on the protocol. In our case we have only one layer and here we have all the
encoding layers. We do not use a middle layer in our code.
3. Bottom Layer - the layer which has the connection with the network ports di-
rectly. For SV and GOOSE communication, we tag the PDU’s with ethernet frame
header and then forward it to the respective ethernet port for publishing it into
the network.
2CMake is an open-source, cross-platform family of tools designed to build, test and package soft-
ware. CMake is used to control the software compilation process using simple platform and compiler
independent configuration files, and generate native makefiles and workspaces that can be used in the
compiler environment of your choice[12]
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The figures above had some event variables mentioned in the function calls. The
events sent and received from the function blocks are tabulated below.
Event Name I/O Names Direction Description
Init Positive INIT+ Input Open new connection
Init Negative INIT- Input Close connection
Request Positive REQ+/RSP+ Input Send data
Request Negative REQ-/RSP- Input Ignore value
Init Positive INITO+ Output New connection established
Init Negative INITO- Output Connection closed
Confirm Positive CNF+/IND+ Output New data available
Confirm Negative CNF-/IND- Output Received data is invalid
Table 6: Events received/sent from FB’s [1]
3.3 The Integration
The IEC61850 protocols are implemented using the network layer architecture of IEC61499.
This section uses the explanation of the basics of the network layers in case of both the
protocols and put it together in order to achieve a SV and GOOSE Transmission from
the Function Block.
3.3.1 Physical Layer Implementation
SV and GOOSE are ethernet protocols and hence use LAN ports of any system. So the
first task is to be able to access the LAN ports of the development system. The ports in
a linux based operating system can be found out by the following. Figure.(16) shows
the command line instruction and the corresponding results. We can observe that the
first port enp0s31f6 has type ether with the MAC address 54:e1:ad:5f:28:fb. This is the
port we are interested in.
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Figure 16: Scanning ports of a system
Each network card is secured in a way that only messages for the respective MAC
address would be received. If we need to read all the messages coming onto the port
we need to run the port in promiscuous mode. If we compare the figures 16 and 17, we
see the additional flag PROMISC enabled on the port. This has now enabled all the
data from the port to be sent to the CPU.
Figure 17: Enabling Promiscuous mode on the LAN port
Now that the port is ready to send and receive SV and GOOSE packets. In order
to send a raw packet data the following portion of code is written. The following
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methods from linux socket programming that have been used to enable the ethernet
socket mentioned above to be able to send and receive SV and GOOSE messages. In
general the following are the steps to be followed.
1. Opening a socket for a specific communication protocol, if this command is un-
successful we will receive -1, else the socket number in the list of ports.
sockfd = socket(socket_family, socket_type, protocol)
2. Sending a message on a socket is achieved by the following function.
sendto(sockfd, *data_buf, length, flags, *dest_addr, addrlen)
3. Receiving a message on a socket is achieved by the following function.
recvfrom(sockfd, *data_buf, length, flags, *src_addr, addrlen)
Apart from these there are built-in functions in linux systems which can get the sys-
tems MAC address and these are also run along with the socket programming portion
and stored in a variable for later use. The destination MAC is usually mentioned by
the user as part of the ID in the main application.
3.3.2 Data-Link Layer Implementation
In this section the data link layer in general for both GOOSE and SV is explained.
There is not much difference between both of their ethernet headers except for the
length of the frame and ethertype. The destination address mentioned in the application
is transferred to this layer when the openConnection method is being executed. At this
point we allot the data to a structure carrying ethernet header.
struct mVLAN_ethhdr {
uint8_t ether_dhost[ETH_ALEN]; /* destination MAC addr */
uint8_t ether_shost[ETH_ALEN]; /* source MAC addr */
uint16_t ether_TPID;
uint16_t ether_TCI;
uint16_t ether_type;
uint16_t ether_svAPPID;
uint16_t ether_length;
uint16_t ether_reserve1;
uint16_t ether_reserve2;
struct APDU Apdu;
}__attribute__ ((__packed__));
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The source address is generated when the socket methods are executed and are stored
in the structure. TPID and TCI are the VLAN ID related data and they are fixed data
which is allotted when the structure is initialized. ethertype, svAPPID, reserve1 and re-
serve2 are allotted in the beginning during openConnection method being run. The only
variable data is the length here. This is usually waited and allotted when the data is
sent from the Application Layer to the Data-link Layer.
Since the length of the data frame has to be edited at the end, we declare the ether-
net header as a pointer to a buffer and hence have the location of the length with
respect to the start of the pointer in mind. This helps us later to update the value to
the data-frame.
3.3.3 Application Layer
SV and GOOSE communication protocols have the same structure until data-link layer.
They differ at the application layer. This is because of the different information and
purpose they carry with them. We will first look into SV. The following steps are taken
in order to receive data, serialize it and encapsulate it into the SV APDU.
1. The data being extracted from the function block in the 4diac-ide and then stored
in a memory location and then the pointer to the location is shared with the
application layer.
struct svDataset {
int32_t CurrentATCTR1_Amp_instMag_i;
int32_t CurrentATCTR1_Amp_q;
int32_t CurrentBTCTR2_Amp_instMag_i;
int32_t CurrentBTCTR2_Amp_q;
int32_t CurrentCTCTR3_Amp_instMag_i;
int32_t CurrentCTCTR3_Amp_q;
int32_t CurrentNTCTR4_Amp_instMag_i;
int32_t CurrentNTCTR4_Amp_q;
int32_t VoltageATVTR1_Vol_instMag_i;
int32_t VoltageATVTR1_Vol_q;
int32_t VoltageBTVTR2_Vol_instMag_i;
int32_t VoltageBTVTR2_Vol_q;
int32_t VoltageCTVTR3_Vol_instMag_i;
int32_t VoltageCTVTR3_Vol_q;
int32_t VoltageNTVTR4_Vol_instMag_i;
int32_t VoltageNTVTR4_Vol_q;
}__attribute__ ((__packed__));
2. The data is serialized. Serialization is method of formatting the position of the
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bits in the data depending on the platforms endianness. This needs to be done
because of the larger aim of having a platform independent implementation.
3. Once the data is received it is encapsulated with more data tags including the
SVID and then packet into a ASDU.
struct ASDU_LE {
uint8_t seqAsduTag;
uint8_t seqAsduLength;
uint8_t svIdTag;
uint8_t svIdLength;
uint8_t svID;
uint8_t smpCntTag;
uint8_t smpCntLength;
uint16_t smpCnt;
uint8_t confRevTag;
uint8_t confRevLength;
uint32_t confRev;
uint8_t smpSynchTag;
uint8_t smpSynchLength;
uint8_t smpSynch;
uint8_t seqOfDataTag;
uint8_t seqOfDataLength;
struct svDataset dataSet;
}__attribute__ ((__packed__));
4. This ASDU is then encoded into a PDU and then forwarded to the data-link layer
for the addition of the ethernet header and then transmission over LAN port.
struct APDU {
uint8_t savPduTag;
uint8_t savPduLength;
uint8_t noAsduTag;
uint8_t noAsduLength;
uint8_t noAsdu;
uint8_t seqOfAsduTag;
uint8_t seqOfAsduLength;
struct ASDU_LE ASDU1;
}__attribute__ ((__packed__));
The next section describes on how do we design a basic FB for test and then get the
SV data in required form. The same method is used for GOOSE, but since it is just the
state we are considering (which is a single bit boolean data) it is much simpler.
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3.4 SV Communication Test Application
This section shows how to design a test system which can test the Publishing and
Subscribing of Sampled Values from 4diac-ide. The following steps define on how to
design and test the FB for enabling SV Communication.
1. We need to create a structured datatype which has the current, voltage and the
quality values. This is done by creating an XML file which would be used in the
4diac-ide while designing the FB. Check Appendix 8.1
2. To link this to the forte run-time we create a corresponding class which is a in-
herited class of a IEC structure with the same data variables. Refer appendix
8.2
3. Once the data-type is created, we need to create a FB which would combine the
individual values into a structure and vice-versa. This is done by designing a
basic function block and then allotting the input variables and output variables
of the required type and writing the algorithm in Structured Text language as
shown in figure 18 and 19.
Figure 18: Building a Function Block for reading SV data
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Figure 19: Algorithm for reading SV data
4. Once saved this FB, will be saved as an XML code in the workspace which can
be then used in any of the future projects.
5. This FB would be now exported to forte and this would enable its instantisation
and execution at the run-time.
6. Now we do the same for the extracting individual values from a structure which
is received and create a test system which is linked with a publish subscribe
model.
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4 System Testing
The following section explains the different cases of testing which were conducted in
order to check if the system works as expected. The testing has been conducted to
see to what extent can we receive SV packets on a raspberrypi and then interfaced
to a OPAL-RT simulator. The last part is about designing a simple test system which
would show a protection scenario and the transmission of a GOOSE message.
4.1 Assumptions and Limitations
There are a considerable amount of assumptions made as this is only a proof of con-
cept being presented. Some of the attributes in Sampled Values like smpCnt, confRev,
smpSynch are all prefixed to a constant value. The over-current protection system has
a simple step curve. In the third case, we are receiving sampled values at the rate of
500 samples/second. One of the big limitations was not being able to run with real
time systems, hence extensive testing was not possible.
4.2 Sampled Values - reception through a Raspberry pi
This section is a small introduction on how the system is compiled and cross-compiled
from one system to other. We will also focus on how we will execute the systems and
how are the new files linked in order to make it available for the run-time during exe-
cution. The below figure 20 shows how to cross-compile the run-time across different
platforms.
Figure 20: Cross-compiling using Cmake
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Once compiled in the destination folder we need to run the following code which
would compile the executable. sudo (superuser/administrator privileges) is required
because we need to be able to make the executable for socket interfaces. The final
completion of the compilation would look as shown in figure 21.
sudo make all
Figure 21: Building executable forte run-time
Similarly, when executing the file all we need to do is run the following command.
This would run forte on the port 61499, which is default. The same is shown in figure
22
sudo ./forte
Figure 22: Executing Forte-runtime
One of the main aims of IEC 61499 is to be a platform which can aid in developing
platform independent control system for industrial automation. This was the reason
for testing it between a raspberry pi and along with to conduct the basic test of being
able to receive the data frame. After connecting two raspberry pi’s we need to make
sure that they are configured in promiscuous mode in order to be able to read all the
samples arriving at the LAN port. In order to make the forte run-time to be able to
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execute in the raspberry pi we need to compile it using cross compilers to the raspberry
pi platform. The changes from a laptop to raspberry pi is the architecture of the CPU’s
involved. We make use of Cmake for cross-compiling. Once the executable is created
using the cmake, we just need to transfer the run-time to the respective platform and
execute it with super-user rights. This enables the device to access and modify pins
and ports. The figure 23 shows the configuration mentioned inside the 4diac-ide.
Figure 23: The network defined in 4diac-ide
Figure 24: The SV frame received on the 4diac-ide
Now once we, execute forte runtime on both raspberry-pi and the linux system and
then execute the application on IDE, we get the the sampled values being transmitted.
The following figure 24 shows the data being received on the IDE and fig 25 shows the
capture of packets on wireshark.
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Figure 25: The SV frame captured on wireshark
In figure 24, we can see a dotted line between the blocks, this defines that the sys-
tem is placed in different systems. and the dotted line symbolises communication
between them. If we look individually, we see the blocks with additional publish on
raspberry pi (figure 26) and subscribe blocks on the linux system (figure 27) with SV
in the ID, representing that the communication is through Sampled Values.
Figure 26: The SV publish on RaspberryPi
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Figure 27: The SV subscribe on Linux system
4.3 Sampled Values - Reading from a real-time simulator
The system was connected to OPAL-RT simulator present in the lab at KTH Royal
Institute of Technology. The Opal-rt simulator can simulate an actual merging unit by
sending 4000 samples/sec.
Figure 28: The Opal-RT Simulator Bus[7]
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Figure 29: Ubuntu Real-Time Server[7]
Once running the system, we found that the run-time started to crash. This was be-
cause the external-event chain got full. The figure 30 shows the error we have received.
This led to a lot of diving into the concepts of computer and network programming
and we started to analyse the run-time using many performance tools like perf-tools,
vmstat, iostat, tops. On running perf-tools we found the issue. There was a backlog of
instructions which were in queue before in the CPU.
Figure 30: Error on receiving SV from RT server.
The error is shown in the figure 31. There are two terms which are to be focused
on the stalled front-end cycles are the instructions that are awaiting to be sent into the
CPU and the stalled back-end cycles are the instructions that are awaiting to be executed
in the CPU. The reason for this is because of the use of mutexes for transferring data
between threads. These induce a lot of delays in a program execution. According to
the developers, this is still being improved and hence, we will not be able to test it in
real-time as of now.
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Figure 31: The stalled instructions.
4.4 Implementation of a Protection System
Since, we were not able to test the system with a real-time simulator as explained ear-
lier, a small generator code has been written on raspberrypi which acts a merging unit
for this exercise. The raspberry pi is designed to send instantaneous values of a sine
wave with rms values of 450A and 2250A. These were arbitrarily chosen.
The figure 32 shows the operation during the normal phase. The rms value of cur-
rent is shown to be around 420A. This deviation can be attributed to the lack of sam-
ples. We generate only 10 samples/cycle against to the normal standard of 80 sam-
ples/cycle. The working of the system during the fault phase is hsown in figure 33.
When the current increases the threshold, the PTOC block activates and send out the
op.general to TRUE. This is the confirmation of the fault which generates the GOOSE
message with the boolean bit responsible for the information is flagged as TRUE. The
GOOSE message is captured using wireshark3 Hence, verifying the GOOSE message.
3Wireshark is a widely-used network protocol analyzer.
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Figure 34: The GOOSE frame captured on wireshark
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5 Conclusions
The following are the main conclusions drawn from the project development.
1. IEC 61499 can be used to develop portable and reusable blocks of functions based
on the main communication protocols defined in IEC 61850. The network layer
architecture of IEC 61499 is very flexible and allows to develop even low level
protocols which is the first in itself. Until today, there were only protocols which
would run over TCP/IP.
2. The implemented protocols are tested as a proof of concept but due to the inher-
ent issues with forte run-time, testing it with real-time simulator is not possible
at this stage.
3. It is possible to develop system on a platform and then port it to a platform of
different CPU architecture and still work with the control systems developed,
this vouches the initial idea of having a user configurable IED.
IEC 61499 is still new in the field of Electrical protection and automation. The future
seems to be bright looking at what the platform can do today. The work will be in
progress and if people are interested can contact the author through email.
6 Future Works
The following things can be worked on in the future.
1. Perfecting the Sampled Value and GOOSE attributes which were not involved in
the current project. This can be done by designing a front-end system on python
which can parse the XML files when the data connections happen. A small step
towards this can be seen here in [7].
2. One implementation of IEEE/IEC protection curve with calculation of fault time
using Fast Fourier Transform is an exciting prospective.
3. Last but not the least, keeping in loop with the developers by testing and giving
feedbacks helping them rectify the issues which are a barrier for the use of IEC
61499 in real-time systems at low level protocols.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Code for creating a datatype
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE DataType SYSTEM "http://www.holobloc.com/xml/DataType.dtd" >
<DataType Name="dataSet" Comment="SV ASDU Dataset" >
<Identification Standard="61499-2" />
<VersionInfo Organization="4DIAC" Version="1.0" Author="" Date="" />
<CompilerInfo header="package fb.rt.test;" >
</CompilerInfo>
<ASN1Tag Class="APPLICATION" Number="1" />
<StructuredType >
<VarDeclaration Name="iPhsAMag" Type="DINT" />
<VarDeclaration Name="iPhsAq" Type="DINT" />
<VarDeclaration Name="iPhsBMag" Type="DINT" />
<VarDeclaration Name="iPhsBq" Type="DINT" />
<VarDeclaration Name="iPhsCMag" Type="DINT" />
<VarDeclaration Name="iPhsCq" Type="DINT" />
<VarDeclaration Name="iPhsNMag" Type="DINT" />
<VarDeclaration Name="iPhsNq" Type="DINT" />
<VarDeclaration Name="vPhsAMag" Type="DINT" />
<VarDeclaration Name="vPhsAq" Type="DINT" />
<VarDeclaration Name="vPhsBMag" Type="DINT" />
<VarDeclaration Name="vPhsBq" Type="DINT" />
<VarDeclaration Name="vPhsCMag" Type="DINT" />
<VarDeclaration Name="vPhsCq" Type="DINT" />
<VarDeclaration Name="vPhsNMag" Type="DINT" />
<VarDeclaration Name="vPhsNq" Type="DINT" />
</StructuredType>
</DataType>
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8.2 Forte backend code for creating a datatype
/*
* forte_sps.h
*
* Created on: Mar 1, 2019
* Author: root
*/
#ifndef SRC_MODULES_SV_CDC_FORTE_DATASET_H_
#define SRC_MODULES_SV_CDC_FORTE_DATASET_H_
/*
#include "../../../src/core/datatypes/forte_struct.h"
#include "../../../src/core/datatypes/forte_bool.h"
#include "../../../src/core/datatypes/forte_int.h"
#include "../../../src/core/typelib.h"
*/
#include <forte_struct.h>
#include <forte_bool.h>
#include <forte_dint.h>
#include <forte_any.h>
class CIEC_dataSet : public CIEC_STRUCT {
DECLARE_FIRMWARE_DATATYPE(dataSet)
private:
static const CStringDictionary::TStringId scm_unElementTypes[];
static const CStringDictionary::TStringId scm_unElementNames[];
public:
CIEC_dataSet();
virtual ~CIEC_dataSet() {}
CIEC_DINT& iPhsAMag() {
return (static_cast<CIEC_DINT&>(getMembers()[0]));
}
CIEC_DINT& iPhsAq() {
return (static_cast<CIEC_DINT&>(getMembers()[1]));
}
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CIEC_DINT& iPhsBMag() {
return (static_cast<CIEC_DINT&>(getMembers()[2]));
}
CIEC_DINT& iPhsBq() {
return (static_cast<CIEC_DINT&>(getMembers()[3]));
}
CIEC_DINT& iPhsCMag() {
return (static_cast<CIEC_DINT&>(getMembers()[4]));
}
CIEC_DINT& iPhsCq() {
return (static_cast<CIEC_DINT&>(getMembers()[5]));
}
CIEC_DINT& iPhsNMag() {
return (static_cast<CIEC_DINT&>(getMembers()[6]));
}
CIEC_DINT& iPhsNq() {
return (static_cast<CIEC_DINT&>(getMembers()[7]));
}
CIEC_DINT& vPhsAMag() {
return (static_cast<CIEC_DINT&>(getMembers()[8]));
}
CIEC_DINT& vPhsAq() {
return (static_cast<CIEC_DINT&>(getMembers()[9]));
}
CIEC_DINT& vPhsBMag() {
return (static_cast<CIEC_DINT&>(getMembers()[10]));
}
CIEC_DINT& vPhsBq() {
return (static_cast<CIEC_DINT&>(getMembers()[11]));
}
CIEC_DINT& vPhsCMag() {
return (static_cast<CIEC_DINT&>(getMembers()[12]));
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}
CIEC_DINT& vPhsCq() {
return (static_cast<CIEC_DINT&>(getMembers()[13]));
}
CIEC_DINT& vPhsNMag() {
return (static_cast<CIEC_DINT&>(getMembers()[14]));
}
CIEC_DINT& vPhsNq() {
return (static_cast<CIEC_DINT&>(getMembers()[15]));
}
};
#endif /* SRC_MODULES_SV_CDC_FORTE_DATASET_H_ */
